Balancing Fear: Why Counter-Terror Legislation was Blocked after the Oklahoma City and London Bombings by Rubin, Gabriel
Montclair State University
Montclair State University Digital Commons
Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship
and Creative Works Department of Justice Studies
Winter 1-1-2010
Balancing Fear: Why Counter-Terror Legislation
was Blocked after the Oklahoma City and London
Bombings
Gabriel Rubin
Montclair State University, rubing@montclair.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Military, War,
and Peace Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons,
Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Justice Studies at Montclair State University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State
University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.
MSU Digital Commons Citation
Rubin, Gabriel, "Balancing Fear: Why Counter-Terror Legislation was Blocked after the Oklahoma City and London Bombings"
(2010). Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 26.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/26
Published Citation
Rubin, Gabriel. "Balancing fear: why counter-terror legislation was blocked after the Oklahoma City and London Bombings." Historia
Actual Online 22 (2010): 125-142.
HAOL, Núm. 22 (Primavera, 2010), 125-142               ISSN 1696-2060 
© Historia Actual Online 2010 125
 
 
BALANCING FEAR: WHY COUNTER-TERROR 
LEGISLATION WAS BLOCKED AFTER THE 
OKLAHOMA CITY AND LONDON BOMBINGS 
 
Gabriel Rubin 
 
Montclair State University, United States of America. E-mail: rubing@mail.montclair.edu 
 
Recibido: 23 Marzo 2010 / Revisado: 30 Abril 2010 / Aceptado: 8 Mayo 2010 / Publicación Online: 15 Junio 2010 
 
 
Abstract: This article scrutinizes the legislative 
reactions to the Oklahoma City Bombing and 
the 2005 London Bombings to try to decipher 
why counter-terror legislation was substantially 
blocked after these attacks.  It finds that the 
partisan composition of the government and 
executive approval ratings are critical to the 
passage of counter-terror laws.  In light of the 
recent slew of counter-terror legislation passed 
worldwide, cases where counter-terror 
legislation has been blocked have become 
critically important.  To this end, this article 
asks, “Why does counter-terror legislation get 
blocked when it does?”  To answer the question, 
three variables are tested: partisan composition 
of the government, public opinion-based mass 
fear levels, and executive approval ratings.  To 
test the variables, two cases are evaluated: the 
passage of diluted counter-terror legislation after 
the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and after 
the 2005 London Bombings.  In evaluating the 
cases, legislative debates and executive 
statements that occurred after the terror attacks 
are examined and then compared to cases from 
the UK in 1974 and the US in 2001 where 
counter-terror legislation quickly passed.  The 
article concludes that executive approval ratings 
and the partisan composition of the government 
have the most explanatory power in determining 
whether terror attacks will lead to broad counter-
terror legislation or not. 
Keywords: London bombings, counter-terror 
legislation, USA, United Kingdom. 
______________________ 
 
n our post-9/11 world, democratic 
governments’ responses to terror attacks are 
viewed as predictable.  An attack occurs, the 
polity convulses in a fit of rage and fear, the 
chief executive gathers additional powers for 
himself, and civil liberty-abridging counterterror 
legislation is easily passed. This supposedly 
archetypal response to terrorism is not as 
common as many have come to believe.  Indeed, 
many times the chief executive has attempted to 
pass new legislation after a terror attack only to 
find himself stifled by the parliament or 
legislature.  This article explores such cases. 
 
What happens when legislation forwarded by 
the executive gets blocked by the legislature 
after terrorist attacks?  The theory supported 
here holds that the executive is presented with 
an opportunity by the crisis created by a terrorist 
attack, but that he is constrained by levels of 
mass fear, public satisfaction ratings, and 
political institutions.   
 
This article will be organized in the following 
manner.  First, the theory will be summarized.  
Second, why the passage of counter-terror 
legislation should be expected in the UK Blair 
case will be examined.  
 
Third, the case of Tony Blair’s own Labour 
Party blocking his counter-terror legislation after 
the 7 July 2005 London bombings will be 
investigated.  Fourth, the case of the Oklahoma 
City bombing, where the Republican Party 
blocked Bill Clinton’s counter-terror legislation 
for over a year, will be examined.   
 
The Oklahoma City case will bolster findings 
from the Tony Blair case.  Finally, conclusions 
about why we see variation in the passage of 
civil liberty-abridging legislation, the central 
question of this study, will be stated. 
 
I
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1. THE DESCRIPTION OF THEORY 
 
After a terrorist attack occurs, the government 
seems to convulse in a quick and forceful 
reaction.  But the theory that is forwarded and 
supported here shows that the process of 
reaction is much more complex and that those 
reactions vary much more greatly than public 
perception holds.  As depicted in Figure 1, the 
theory begins with the terrorist attack.  That 
attack is viewed as an exogenous variable, that 
is, something that occurs outside of the 
governmental process.  It gets the process going, 
but does not determine how that process will 
transpire.  An important point made by this 
study is that the nature of legislative responses 
to terror attacks cannot be predicted by the 
nature of the attack or by the number of 
fatalities.  The limited reaction to the 7 July 
bombings in London, the 2004 bombings in 
Madrid, and numerous other attacks are 
testament to that fact.
 
Figure 1: The Depiction of the Theory 
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The executive’s role, the independent variable, 
has two components.  First is what I call the 
executive response.  At this stage the executive 
decides generally how to respond to the attack.  
He could try to seek new legislation, seek to 
deport immigrants (among other options) or 
not seek to respond at all.  The executive 
forwards his plan by employing the second 
component of the independent variable: 
executive threat-shaping.  Executive threat-
shaping, defined simply as how the 
government’s chief executive shapes the terror 
threat, is the mechanism by which the 
executive pushes his counter-terrorist agenda.  
Though this study is focused solely on the civil 
implications of this strategy, the way that the 
executive attempts to shape the terror threat 
colors the state’s international response to 
terror as well.  Note that a critical distinction in 
executive threat-shaping strategies is whether 
the leader shapes the threat as an act of war or 
a crime. 
 
The executive’s response and threat-shaping 
strategies are constrained by two broad factors.  
First is public opinion/mass fear.  In this study, 
mass fear levels, public willingness to forego 
liberties and executive approval ratings as well 
as other factors are measured using public 
opinion trend analysis.  These factors work 
either to constrain or to enable executive 
action.  The second constraint variable is 
political institutions.  This variable 
encapsulates the following three factors: 
whether a government is run by a presidential 
or parliamentary system, level of partisan 
competition and government 
composition/party in power.  Though all of 
these constraint variables will be looked at, 
two will be shown to have especially strong 
explanatory power: approval of the executive 
and the government’s partisan composition. 
The legislature, the theory’s intervening 
variable, enters the picture in the next stage of 
the process.  It can either support or block the 
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executive’s proposed legislation.  If it attempts 
to block the new counter-terror laws, an 
interplay between the executive and legislature 
may occur wherein the executive tries to push 
the legislature to pass new legislation by 
shaping the threat accordingly.  This give-and-
take is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1.  
The final stage is passage of civil liberty-
abridging legislation and enforcement of civil 
liberty-abridging legislation.  These two 
outcomes are the dependent variables of this 
theory.   
 
2. WHY SHOULD WE EXPECT 
LEGISLATION TO PASS IN THE 
LONDON BOMBINGS CASE? 
 
Why should we expect counter-terror 
legislation to have been passed after the 
bombings of 7 July 2005?  There are myriad 
reasons why we should expect legislation to 
have passed in this case.  First, in the British 
system the prime minister controls 
government.  That means that as long as the 
prime minister is head of government, all 
legislation that he proposes should pass 
parliament.  Indeed, Tony Blair’s counter-
terror legislation after the London Bombings, 
which sought to prolong detentions for terror 
suspects from 14 days to 90 days, was the first 
legislation that had been blocked by parliament 
in Blair’s eight-plus years in power to that 
date. 
 
Second, the Bush administration successfully 
passed extensive counter-terror law after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  If a 
system that has many more checks on 
executive power was able to pass legislation, 
then we can infer that the Blair government 
should have been able to push through its bill.  
Third, the United Kingdom has a much more 
extremist Muslim population than does the 
United States.  For one, recall the arrests of 24 
suspected terrorists who allegedly were 
plotting to blow up ten airliners flying from 
London to the United States on 10 August 
2006.1  Further, a 2006 poll in the London 
Telegraph found that 4 in 10 British Muslims 
wanted Islamic Law implemented in the 
United Kingdom; that same year a poll in the 
Sunday Times found that 1 in 5 British 
Muslims sympathized with the London 
bombers2.  Fourth, the UK has passed counter-
terror legislation many times will be seen later 
in this article.  Fifth, Britain was at war with 
terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan already, 
making the case for more domestic strictures 
on terrorists, thus, should not have been 
difficult.  
 
Table 1: Case Selection Chart 
 
Finally, consider the cases in Table 1.  As is 
evident, most threats that are shaped as war 
lead to the quick passage of civil liberty-
abridging legislation.  To these, we could add 
many cases, including, for instance, AB 
Vajpayee’s passage of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PoTA) after the 2001 
Parliament bombing in India3, as well as anti-
terror laws passed in Canada, Australia, New  
 
 
Zealand, and Japan after 11 September4.  Tony 
Blair was the only executive who both shaped 
the threat as war and was substantially blocked 
in his attempt to pass anti-terror law, making 
his case a critically important one. 
 
 
 
 
 Threat Shaped as War Threat Shaped as Crime 
Legislation Quickly Passed George W. Bush, 9/11 
 
Ariel Sharon, second intifada 
 
Harold Wilson, 1974 
Birmingham bombing 
Yitzchak Rabin, first intifada 
 
Legislation Substantially 
Blocked 
Tony Blair, 7/7/05 Bill Clinton-1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing 
 
Bill Clinton-1993 World 
Trade Center bombing 
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3. THE 7 JULY 2005 LONDON 
BOMBINGS 
 
Why did the legislature block the Blair 
government’s efforts to enact a new set of 
counter-terror laws? Before testing the theory 
described above, it is worth highlighting that 
British parliament has passed civil liberty-
abridging legislation in the past. For example, 
eight days after the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) bombed pubs in Birmingham, killing 21 
people and wounding 160, the parliament 
adopted the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism 
Act.5 At the time, Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson plainly described the attacks as an act 
of war6.  The bill passed through the House of 
Commons and House of Lords with 
remarkable speed despite the slim majority that 
Harold Wilson’s Labour Party enjoyed.  
Indeed, the previous month’s election had 
given the Labour Party a slim three-seat 
majority7.   
 
Parliament’s ability to block Blair’s post-
London Bombings bill is curious because Blair 
enjoyed a greater majority in Parliament, the 
London Bombings killed significantly more 
people, and the new laws Blair proposed would 
not have been much different from laws that 
had already been passed time and again by 
previous governments.  One further cannot 
argue that Britain was not at war in 2005 and 
was in 1974.  Both Tony Blair, as will be seen 
below, and Harold Wilson shaped the terrorist 
threat as a war, and British forces are today 
still at war in Iraq and Afghanistan with 
Islamist extremists. 
 
3.1. The Attacks 
 
On the morning of 7 July 2005, as rush hour 
was drawing to a close, a series of explosions 
carried out by radical jihadist suicide bombers 
hit the London public transportation system.  
At 8:50 a.m. a bomb exploded on a subway 
train leaving Edgware Road station killing 
seven people and wounding 40. At the same 
time, a bomb exploded on a train traveling 
between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station 
killing ten people and wounding over a 
hundred.  In the deadliest attack of the day, 
also on the tube and also at 8:50 a.m., 27 
people were killed and dozens injured when a 
bomb exploded on the Piccadilly line train near 
King’s Cross station.  About an hour later, at 
9:47 a.m., a bomb exploded on the upper deck 
of the No. 30 bus as it traveled through 
Tavistock Square; fourteen people were killed 
and dozens wounded8.  All told, 56 people, 
including the four bombers, were killed and 
over 700 wounded due to the attacks on July 7, 
20059.  Two weeks later to the day, on July 21, 
2005, four more bombers failed to carry out an 
identical attack targeting three underground 
stations and a bus.  The bombers were 
thwarted by the failure of their bombs to fully 
explode10. 
 
The first reports about the bombings held that 
the attackers were Britons of Pakistani origin 
who were born, raised and radicalized in the 
United Kingdom11.  But whereas three of the 
bombers were British nationals of Pakistani 
origin who lived in West Yorkshire (the fourth 
was a Jamaican-born British national), their 
radicalization had strong foreign connections12.  
Two of the bombers visited Pakistan in 2004.  
Further, an al-Qaeda member that had entered 
England via a Channel port two weeks before 
the blasts, left Britain a few hours before the 
bombings.  Moreover, the explosives used in 
the bombings were similar to those used by al-
Qaeda13.  A year after the bombings, al-
Qaeda’s spiritual leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 
claimed that two of the bombers had been 
trained for suicide operations at an al-Qaeda 
camp14.   
 
Though there are tensions between Britain’s 
Muslim and Christian populations, the attacks 
were not as “home-grown” as initially 
reported.  Indeed, terrorism analyst Peter 
Bergen stated a year after the bombings that, 
“the London attacks were a classic al-Qaeda 
operation and not the work of self-starting 
terrorists as has been repeatedly suggested in 
the media”15.  It turns out, then, that this was 
one case of international terrorism that was 
framed by the media as an attack by local 
elements.  The response to the London attacks, 
thus, may have been more muted due to this 
local-framing by the media (as opposed to the 
media framing the attack as perpetrated by 
foreign forces and part of a larger war)16.  As 
will be seen below, this media framing had 
little to do with how Tony Blair sought to 
shape the threat. 
 
3.2. Executive Response 
 
At the time of the bombings, Tony Blair was 
hosting the meetings of the Group of Eight (G-
8) in Scotland.  That day, he made a statement 
framing the threat of terrorism as war, stating:  
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“It is important … that those engaged in 
terrorism realize that our determination to 
defend our values and our way of life is greater 
than their determination to cause death and 
destruction to innocent people in a desire to 
impose extremism on the world.  Whatever 
they do, it is our determination that they will 
never succeed in destroying what we hold dear 
in this country and in other civilized nations 
throughout the world”17.   
 
Blair’s statement framed the conflict against 
terror as a worldwide one.  He implied that the 
world was entangled in a war between 
civilized nations and extremist terrorists.  The 
threat magnitude was thus large, but, Blair 
suggested, the government would protect its 
people. 
 
Three days later Blair made a speech wherein 
he spoke of his “revulsion” at the terrorist 
attacks.  Blair outlined what had transpired 
during the attacks and named the probable 
perpetrators as “Islamic extremist terrorists, of 
the kind who over recent years have been 
responsible for many innocent deaths in 
Madrid, Bali, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt[,] 
Morocco” and on 11 September.  Blair asked 
for additional anti-terror legislation, noting that 
Parliament had already pledged to pass further 
counter-terror legislation earlier in the year.  
He also set the tone for future statements when 
he stated that, “If, as the fuller picture about 
these incidents emerges and the investigation 
proceeds, it becomes clear that there are 
powers which the police and intelligence 
agencies need immediately to combat 
terrorism, it is plainly sensible to reserve the 
right to return to Parliament with an 
accelerated timetable.”  He closed by lauding 
the Muslim community of Britain saying that, 
“We will work with you to make the moderate 
and true voice of Islam heard as it should 
be”18.  Blair’s statements framed the conflict as 
one between innocent civilians and Islamic 
extremists, he stated that liberty-security 
tradeoffs would have to be made, and that 
Muslims in England should be tolerated.  
Blair’s linking of the 7 July attacks to 11 
September and other terror attacks from around 
the world, implied a high magnitude of threat. 
 
Two weeks after the London bombings, Blair 
stated that he would not give “one inch” to 
terrorists and that he sought to confront them 
on “every level.”  He also stated that, 
“September 11 for me was a wake up call.  Do 
you know what I think the problem is?  That a 
lot of the world woke up for a short time and 
then turned over and went back to sleep 
again.”  Meanwhile, Conservative Party leader, 
and head of Blair’s opposition, stated that, 
“One of the principle objectives of the 
terrorists is to divide us, one from another.  So 
far … they have failed in that objective. … 
[W]e believe it is so important that we 
approach these difficult issues in a spirit of 
consensus, with the objective of reaching 
agreement wherever we possibly can”19.  This 
speech was Blair’s most urgent yet and it 
framed the threat as an urgent issue that cannot 
be ignored.  It is important to note that at this 
stage, Tory rhetoric supported Blair. 
 
Three and a half months after the London 
bombings, the Blair government unveiled new 
counter-terror legislation that would allow the 
British government to detain terror suspects for 
three months without charge, make the 
glorification or encouragement of terrorism an 
offense, and outlaw attending terror training 
camps in the UK or abroad.  The proposed bill 
would have greatly affected free speech in 
Britain.  According to Guardian columnist 
Seamus Milne, “under the terms of the bill, 
anyone who voices support for armed 
resistance to any state or occupation, however 
repressive or illegitimate, will be committing a 
criminal offense carrying a seven-year prison 
sentence”20.  The legislation was introduced 
about one month after a video of one of the 7 
July bombers was released that linked him to 
al-Qaeda21.  
 
3.3. Legislative Opposition 
 
In this section, Blair’s attempts to pass a 90-
day detention will be focused on.  Blair 
received strong opposition to his legislation 
almost immediately after he presented it.  On 3 
November 2005, Blair made the case for his 
legislation by stating that, “We have got to 
decide whether the civil liberties of people 
who are terrorism suspects should come before 
the civil liberties of the vast majority of people 
in this country.  I say the civil liberties of those 
law abiding people should come first.”  Blair’s 
legislation was already struggling to pass due 
to a coalition between ministers of parliament 
on the right and the left that were fed up with 
Tony Blair’s rule22.  The Conservatives, 
Liberal Democrats, and Labour rebels that 
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opposed Blair’s legislation proffered a 
compromise: a 28-day detention period23. 
 
Blair convinced Labour MP David Winnick to 
re-table the “rebel” Terrorism Bill amendment 
that would have set the detention limit at 28 
days.  Still, ministers in Blair’s own party were 
disappointed with the Prime Minister’s 
legislation and criticized him by saying that his 
politics were not in line with those of the 
Labour Party24.  By 6 November 2005, Blair 
was convinced that his legislation would not 
pass.  He withdrew negotiations on the 90-day 
limit and told the Home Secretary, Charles 
Clarke, to seek a compromise over the 
detention issue, as well as over separate plans 
to criminalize religious hatred and outlaw the 
glorification of terrorism25. 
 
After attempts to magnify the terrorist threat 
once again backfired—Blair called the 
potential blocking of the 90-day detention, a 
“defeat for the security of the country” and 
accused Parliament of “woeful 
complacency”—the Prime Minister finally 
accepted that his bill would not pass26.  Yet the 
very next day, on 8 November 2005, Blair 
once again tried to push through the 90-day 
detention limit, this time with a sunset clause.  
The Prime Minister stated that, “If we are 
forced to compromise, it will be a compromise 
with this nation’s security.”   Blair pointed to a 
Times (of London) poll that found that 64% of 
the British public supported the 90-day rule.  
The head of the Conservative Party, Michael 
Howard countered that, “if you want to look 
for a precedent for 90 days, I suggest you find 
it in the apartheid regime in South Africa when 
the 90-day rule was one of the most notorious 
aspects of that regime”27.   
 
It is important to note here that Blair’s strategy 
for passing his terrorism legislation included 
repeatedly pointing to the fact that the police 
requested the 90-day detention limit.  In 
essence, Blair was arguing that it was not he 
who desired this law, but rather heads of police 
that had asked for it.  This strategy was 
ineffective as it shifted the process from one of 
an executive demanding legislation from the 
legislature to one of the executive asking the 
legislature, on behalf of experts, for legislation.  
Further, Parliament never fully understood 
why the police “required” the 90-day detention 
limit28.  Effectively, Blair had stopped pushing 
the anti-terror legislation as a solution to a 
threat and, instead, was pushing the legislation 
as a tactical tool to help law enforcement.  This 
formulation of the threat proved weak as it was 
easier for ministers of parliament to oppose the 
police than it was to oppose Blair and the 
public he purportedly represented.  The 
reasoning behind Blair’s bill was hidden in a 
letter from Andy Hayman, the assistant 
commissioner for the Metropolitan Police, 
rather than pronounced publicly and repeatedly 
by the Prime Minister29. 
 
As expected, Blair’s counter-terror legislation 
was blocked—the first legislation Blair had 
proposed in eight-plus years of power to be 
blocked—when 49 members of his own party 
joined the opposition to defeat the bill.  In its 
stead, Parliament passed the 28 day detention 
limit proposal30.  Statements such as those of 
one Tory Member of Parliament who shouted, 
“We aren’t a police state” trumped Blair’s calls 
that the 90-day limit was necessary to protect 
the country from terrorism31.  The fallout from 
the blocked passage of Blair’s anti-terror bill 
eventually led to Tony Blair’s resignation, 
which he announced would occur within a year 
on 7 September 200632. 
 
3.4. What Happened? 
 
How did Tony Blair’s own party block his 
anti-terror legislation?  In order to answer this 
question, we will now examine each variable 
described in Figure 1 to decipher the main 
cause behind Tony Blair’s counterintuitive 
fate.  As detailed above, the independent 
variable in this article’s theory is executive 
response and threat-shaping.  Blair clearly tried 
to push a civil liberty-reducing response and 
did so by shaping the terror threat as a broad 
and urgent one.  He continued to forward this 
response months after the 90-day detention 
period was turned down by parliament.  For 
example, on March 21, 2006, Blair made a 
speech where he framed the battle between 
terrorists and democracies as “a clash about 
civilization.”  He stated that, “this is not a 
clash between civilizations.  It is a clash about 
civilization.  It is the age-old battle between 
progress and reaction, … between optimism 
and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and 
fear on the other”33.  So, Blair did push 
counter-terror legislation and he did frame the 
terror threat accordingly.  Still, he faced strong 
legislative opposition, had to fall back on using 
the police as an excuse for his counterterror 
agenda, and finally was thwarted in his anti-
terror efforts. 
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Could the institution of parliamentary 
government have been the cause of Blair’s 
demise?  As established above, this cannot be 
the case.  Parliamentary political systems 
actually allow prime ministers to pass law 
much more easily than executives in 
presidential systems.  Moreover, the analysis in 
a previous study on the variant responses of 
presidential and parliamentary systems’ 
reactions to terror attacks34, showed few 
differences if any between the two systems’ 
responses to terrorism.  Furthermore, counter-
terror laws have been repeatedly passed in 
Britain and have passed quite quickly, as seen 
in the above case on the 1974 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act.  The only way that prime 
ministers can have their legislation blocked is 
if they lose their ruling coalitions.  In this case, 
it appears that Blair lost his, despite the 
continuation of Labour rule.   But it was not 
due to institutional constraints. Next let us turn 
to findings on public opinion and mass fear.  
First, did the public desire that the government 
gain extra-police powers after the July 7, 2005 
bombings?  The answer is yes.  An ICM/ News 
World survey polled respondents using the 
following prompt: “There are a number of 
people living in Britain who the authorities 
have identified as posing a potential terrorist 
threat.  Do you think extra powers should or 
should not be made available to deport or 
detain them?”  As Figure 2 demonstrates, 88% 
of respondents to the 17 July 2005 poll said 
that their government should have extra 
powers to deport or detain terrorists, or to do 
both. 
 
Figure 2. UK Extra Police Powers 
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An alternate explanation for the blocked 
legislation may be that fear levels did not rise 
after the attacks.  After all, many pundits 
pointed to the famed “stiff upper lip” of 
Londoners and their stoic, balanced response 
to terrorism35.  Yet, as Figure 3 demonstrates, 
mass fear levels in Britain did rise after the  
 
London bombings by 20 percentage points36.  
Though fear levels receded precipitously 
within a year of the attacks, this drawdown of 
fear levels is a common occurrence.  Mass fear 
levels after terror attacks occur generally spike 
and then recede.  Therefore, Britons responded 
rather typically to this terror attack37. 
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Figure 3. Percent Fearful of Terrorism in UK, 2004-2006 
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Figure 4. Blair: Approval Rating, 1997-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The important poll figure in explaining this 
case is Blair’s approval rating.  Figure 4 
compiles data acquired from the Ipsos-MORI 
Political Monitor on the Prime Minister’s 
approval ratings. Surprisingly, Blair saw no 
rally ‘round the leader effect’ after the 7 July 7 
bombings.  His approval ratings, already at 
39%, moved upward slightly due to the 
bombings but then dipped back down to 39% a 
month later.  Without sufficient public support, 
Blair did not have a strong enough mandate to 
pass further civil liberty reductions.  Notice in 
Figure 4 Blair did see a surge in his support 
after the 11 September 11 attacks.  Thus, not 
all terror attacks yield increased support for the 
executive.  
 
3.5. Contributing Factors: Executive 
Mandate and Previous Legislation 
 
There are two other contributing factors for the 
failure of Blair’s post-London bombings anti-
terror legislation.  The first is that in addition 
to Blair’s low approval ratings, he did not have 
a strong mandate.  Though it is true that the 
partisan composition of the House of 
Commons clearly favored the Prime Minister, 
as Labour held the majority in parliament, his 
party was not behind him.  Statements like 
those above about Blair’s actions not being 
indicative of the Labour Party’s platform are 
testament to that fact; so too, of course, is the 
fact that Blair’s own ministers of parliament 
voted against him on the anti-terror bill.  
Though Blair’s approval ratings had been low 
for at least a year before the bombings, his 
party may have felt pressure from the 
opposition due to its recent electoral gains.  
Indeed, Labour had lost 47 parliamentary seats 
in the 2005 election.  The election losses, 
coupled with the Blair’s low approval ratings, 
drove home the fact that the British public was 
growing weary of Blair’s rule of Labour; his 
mandate, thus, was weak and his party chose to 
stand against him for this reason. 
 
A second reason why Blair’s legislation was 
blocked is that anti-terror legislation had just 
been contentiously passed in March 2005.  The 
March legislation made house arrests for terror 
suspects, without charge or trial, legal38.  These 
house arrests, called control orders, forbid a 
terror suspect from using the phone or 
Internet39.  The control order law came into 
effect only after raucous debate in the House of 
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Commons and a rare hold-up in the House of 
Lords40. 
 
Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party had 
basically become synonymous with the new 
“security state” that Great Britain had become.  
His parliament passed the 2005 Serious 
Organized Crime and Police Act, which 
prohibited protestors from demonstrating 
within one kilometer of Parliament.  He also 
spearheaded the creation of the national system 
of license-plate recognition cameras and, in 
2006, the national identity card system41.  
Under Blair, certainly due to the very real 
threat of terrorism, Britain has become a 
surveillance state, in which there is one closed-
circuit TV camera for every 14 citizens42.  
Blair’s rule had incrementally, but radically 
changed the nature of government in Britain; 
government was now more pervasive, intrusive 
and powerful.  The public’s distaste for this 
outcome was made clear in the debates over 
the 2005 pre-London bombings terror bill, and 
eventually led to the defection of Labour Party 
members and the ouster of Tony Blair.  Blair’s 
weak mandate, exhibited most obviously in his 
low approval ratings but also in Labour Party 
electoral losses, and previous legislative 
actions led to the blocked passage of his anti-
terror legislation. 
 
4. THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 
 
Let us now turn to a second case of counter-
terror legislation being substantially blocked 
by a legislature in order to assess the results of 
the London Bombings case.  The subsequent 
case examines the blocked passage of 
President William Clinton’s counter-terror 
legislation after the 19 April 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing.  Like in the previous case, 
compromise legislation was eventually passed, 
in the form of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDP) of 1996.  Still, the 
AEDP was not passed until a year after the 
Oklahoma City bombing—and three years 
after the first World Trade Center bombing.   
 
Here I examine the Oklahoma City bombing 
looking at executive threat-shaping after the 
bombing, the legislative debate that transpired, 
the content of the counterterror legislation 
proposed, and the reasons for the stalled 
passage of the post-terror attack legislation.   
 
The case will be examined, once again, by 
going through the variables the theory 
described above.   
 
4.1. Executive Threat-Shaping: A Moving 
Target 
 
On the morning of April 19, 1995 at 9:03am, 
Timothy McVeigh, an anti-government 
extremist, drove a rented Ryder truck full of 
homemade explosive into the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma.  The resulting explosion destroyed 
half of the nine-story federal building and 
damaged twenty-five surrounding buildings.  It 
also took the lives of 168 people and wounded 
674 more43.  The Oklahoma City bombing was 
the largest terrorist attack to date on US soil. 
 
In the immediate hours after the Oklahoma 
City bombing, Middle Eastern terrorists were 
thought to have been the perpetrators of the 
attack.  In fact, it was reported on the CBS 
Evening News that a government source had 
stated that the bombing had, “Middle Eastern 
terrorism written all over it”44.  As will be 
shown below, the fact that a white, US-born, 
anti-government extremist was behind the 
attack drastically changed the way in which 
Clinton framed the threat.  Instead of calling 
for a war against terrorists, Clinton called for 
the crimes of a narrow group of anti-
government extremists to be contained.  
Clinton’s framing of the threat as a crime 
clearly did not make his proposed counter-
terror legislation appear urgent. 
 
On 21 April 1995, Clinton made broad threats 
against the potential bombers, calling the 
bombing, “an attack on the United States.”  He 
declared that he would consider military 
retaliation if the bombers turned out to be 
foreigners.  “There is no place to hide,” 
Clinton announced.  “Nobody can hide any 
place in this country, nobody can hide any 
place in this world, from the terrible 
consequences of what has been done”45.  Still, 
Clinton preached tolerance stating: “This is not 
a question of anyone’s country of origin.  This 
is not a question of anybody’s religion.  This 
was murder, this was evil”46.  Counter-terror 
legislation had already been introduced in 
February 1995 under the Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act, but the bill had stalled in 
Congress; now it appeared that passage of new 
counter-terror legislation would be inevitable47.   
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Four days after the bombing, with the news out 
that the perpetrator was not a Muslim but 
rather a right-wing extremist, Clinton spoke in 
Oklahoma City at the post-bombing memorial 
prayer service.  He tried to calm the families of 
the victims by recalling the words of a widow 
whose husband was murdered when Pan 
American flight 103 was bombed in 1988.  She 
said that, “The hurt you feel must not be 
allowed to turn into hate, but instead into the 
search for justice.”  But only a few paragraphs 
later, Clinton asserted that, “one thing we owe 
those who have sacrificed [i.e., the victims] is 
the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces 
which gave rise to this evil.”  Clinton 
continued to frame the conflict as one between 
regular Americans and members of irrational 
hate-groups.  He was not attempting to shape 
the threat as a war, but rather as an important 
internal struggle between those Americans 
who follow the rule of law and those who 
believe it does not apply to them.  Indicative of 
his even-keeled message, Clinton declared 
that, “we will stand against the forces of fear.  
When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up 
and talk against it”48.  The importance of the 
conflict seemed to recede as Clinton now 
assailed militia groups, right-wing extremists 
and even “the influence centers in our 
culture—the entertainment industry, the sports 
industry”49.   
 
Clinton’s blunted rhetoric was also present in a 
5 May 1995 speech at Michigan State 
University in which he defended the American 
government, arguing that Americans have 
more freedom than most people in the world, 
and recanted the limits on government imposed 
by the Constitution.  He further stated that, 
“Our founding fathers created a system of laws 
in which reason could prevail over fear”50.  
That said, he continued to state that Americans 
were vulnerable due to the existence of “evil” 
ultra-right paramilitary groups and pushed the 
terror threat as one with a great magnitude.  He 
did this by playing on Americans’ worst fears, 
“No one is free in an America where parents 
have to worry when they drop off their 
children for day care, or when you are the 
target of assassination simply because you 
work for the government,” he said51. 
 
Even with the threat shaped as a crime that 
needed to be contained, the passage of liberty-
abridging counter-terror laws appeared certain 
after the bombing52.  Yet, an April 24, 1995 
Irish Times article that doubted the passage of 
Clinton’s new law proved prescient.  It stated:  
 
“while the mood in the US can be compared to 
that in Britain in 1974 when parliament rushed 
through the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the 
wake of the Birmingham bombings, it is by no 
means certain the Republican majority in 
Congress will favor a curtailing of civil 
liberties, especially when targeted against 
groups that are more likely to have Republican 
sympathies”53.  
 
4.2. The Proposed Legislation and the 1996 
Antiterrorism Act  
 
Before delving into the year-long debate 
between the President and Congress over new 
antiterror legislation, let us first look at the 
content of the legislation that Clinton 
proposed, and that was eventually passed.  
Looking at the legislation here will provide 
context for the legislative debate that 
transpired.  Clinton’s proposed counter-terror 
legislation contained the following provisions 
that made it into the final legislation, which 
was passed one year after the Oklahoma 
bombing.   
 
The 1996 Antiterrorism Act, “established a 
special court that would use secret evidence to 
deport noncitizens accused of association with 
terrorist groups; it gave the executive branch 
the power to criminalize fundraising for lawful 
activities conducted by organizations labeled 
‘terrorist’; it repealed the Edwards amendment, 
which prohibited the FBI from opening 
investigations based on First Amendment 
activities; and it resurrected the discredited 
ideological visa denial provisions of the [1952] 
McCarran-Walter Act to bar aliens based on 
their associations rather than their acts”54.    
 
The legislation allowed the FBI to gather 
information more freely on paramilitary 
groups55, but increased wiretapping authority 
was blocked by Republicans in Congress who 
were worried about the curtailment of civil 
liberties56.  
 
Basically, the act allowed the Department of 
State to designate groups as “terrorist,” and 
thus made granting visas to their members and 
providing these groups with humanitarian aid 
or donations a crime57.  Americans banks 
would also have to freeze the funds of the 
members of any organization deemed as 
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terrorist58.  Further, under the Act the 
government could “invoke … secret evidence 
provisions whenever the attorney general 
determine[d] that public disclosure of the 
evidence against an alleged ‘alien terrorist’ 
would ‘pose a risk to the national security of 
the United States or the security of any 
person’”59.  The bill impacted mainly Muslims 
who were accused of association with terrorist 
groups60.    
 
4.3. The Debate: Republicans Defend Civil 
Liberties against Security-Minded 
Democrats 
 
With the terror threat shaped as a marginal 
one, Clinton’s anti-terror legislation, originally 
proposed in February 1995, appeared out of 
place.  The President was harping on the threat 
of hate speech and right-wing zealots61, while 
forwarding legislation that made it easier to 
deport immigrants allegedly linked to terror 
groups62.  Five days after the bombing, the 
Senate passed a symbolic resolution 
condemning the bombing and praising the 
President for the rapid aid he helped the 
victims receive.  The resolution also vowed 
that the Senate would “expeditiously approve” 
new counter-terrorism legislation63.  On April 
27, 1995, the Senate leaders of the majority 
Republican Party introduced an updated anti-
terror bill to the judiciary committee.  
Amending the previously proposed counter-
terror bill, the new, proposed bill would add 
tags made of microscopic particles to raw 
materials that could be used for bomb making, 
allow the military to participate in domestic 
criminal cases, give the FBI more leeway in 
conducting electronic surveillance, and stiffen 
penalties for attacks on federal employees64. 
 
Though the American public was in a state of 
fear and Clinton was pushing new legislation, 
Republican Senator Bob Dole, the majority 
leader in the Senate, counseled patience.  Dole 
stated, on an ABC news program, his view 
that, “we better move slowly on the legislation 
we’re considering, make certain we get it right 
so we can sit here a year form now … and say 
we did the right thing … instead of getting 
caught up in emotion and going too far and 
maybe end up trampling on” an innocent 
person or group’s rights65.  In response to the 
Republican Party’s sense of calm, Clinton 
publicly argued on 2 May 1995 that America’s 
open society was vulnerable “to the forces of 
organized evil,” while U.S. Treasury officials 
asked Congress for increased funding and legal 
authority to combat what they described as a 
war on the federal government66.  By the end 
of the month, Clinton declared that, “Congress 
has a right to review this legislation to make 
sure the civil liberties of American citizens are 
not infringed … but they should not go slow.  
Terrorists do not go slow, my fellow 
Americans.  Their agenda is death and 
destruction on their own timetable”67.  In 
response, Senator Dole threatened to “pull 
down” the counter-terror bill if President 
Clinton did not rein in Democrats who had 
added 67 amendments to it68.   
 
Three days later, on 7 June 1995, seven weeks 
after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate 
overwhelmingly passed Bill Clinton’s 
counterterror legislation in a 91-8 vote69.  The 
bill contained a key provision fought for by 
Republicans that limited the appeals of death 
row inmates in Federal courts70.  Two weeks 
later, the House Judiciary Committee approved 
the legislation71, but it would rot in the House 
for a year before it would finally be passed.  A 
coalition of far-right and far-left members of 
the House of Representatives stymied the bill 
on grounds of civil liberties and gun ownership 
rights72.   
 
Clinton’s anti-terrorism bill had been heralded 
by House Democrats, such as Dick Gephardt, 
who stated on 15 May1995: “We must do more 
than merely convicting those responsible for 
this horrific act of violence, and bringing them 
to swift and certain punishment. We must 
serve warning to all who would use extremist 
means to advance their extremist ideas: We 
will use the full force of our laws to find them, 
to punish them, and to rid our society of their 
hateful acts. And when those laws aren't 
enough, we'll write tough new laws to rein in 
their wanton bloodshed and terrorism.”73 
 
While House Republicans counseled patience, 
some Democrats repeatedly stated that the 
passage of new counter-terror legislation was 
both necessary and urgent74. 
 
Despite the Democrats’ claims of urgency, an 
unlikely coalition of special interest groups 
made up of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), the National Rifle Association 
(NRA), and Arab and Muslim groups, joined 
together to block the bill in the House.  House 
Republicans were also uneasy about passing a 
bill aimed against anti-government libertarians 
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and gun owners.  Meanwhile, House Judiciary 
Committee chairman Henry Hyde (a 
Republican) excised the legislation of its 
roving wiretap provision and tucked into it 
Republican Party Contract with America crime 
provisions that relaxed laws on habeas corpus 
and allowed for speedier death penalties75. 
  
 
On March 13, 1995, the Republican House 
majority voted 246-171 to weaken Clinton’s 
antiterrorism bill.  House members said that 
they feared the federal government more than 
they feared terrorists76.  Finally, the anti-terror 
legislation, now called the Anti-terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was 
passed by the House on 15 April 1996.  
Democratic Representative Charles Schumer 
complained that, “this bill should be called the 
better-than-nothing anti-terrorism bill”77. In his 
weekly radio address, the President bitterly 
complained that House Republicans had gutted 
the counter-terror bill, largely by removing its 
provision for roving wiretaps “under pressure 
from the Washington gun lobby”78.  The House 
gave its final approval for the bill in a 
bipartisan 293-133 vote on 18 April.  Rep. 
Henry Hyde stated that the compromise 
legislation, “maintains the delicate balance 
between freedom and order”79.  Five days after 
the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City 
bombing, Clinton signed the new 
counterterrorism bill80. 
 
4.4. Why Was Clinton’s Anti-terror 
Legislation Blocked for One Year? 
 
There are numerous reasons for why it took 
Clinton’s proposed anti-terror legislation over 
one year to pass through Congress.  We will 
evaluate those reasons looking first at 
executive response and threat-shaping, then 
public opinion and mass fear, and finally 
institutional variables.  The way in which 
President Clinton shaped the terror threat 
certainly hurt his legislation’s cause.  He 
shaped the threat as a crime and though he 
continually spoke to the urgency of the terror 
threat, his framing of the conflict as one 
between law-abiding Americans and anti-
government hate groups and right-wing 
extremists did not resonate with Congress or 
the public.  One might argue that he had no 
choice in shaping the threat as such, but he 
could have pointed more often to the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, the original 
cause for the proposed legislation, as well as 
the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidians in 
Waco, Texas.  Instead, the President pointed 
fingers at right-wing personalities such as Rush 
Limbaugh and at the right to bear arms, a 
strategy which alienated the majority 
Republican Congress.   
 
On the public opinion front, mass fear levels 
were high after the Oklahoma City bombing, 
but the nature of public opinion surveys makes 
it difficult to tell whether or not there was a 
bump in mass fear levels.  At best, available 
data allows us to surmise that there was a rise 
in fear levels after the bombing and 
conclusively state that fear levels were high.  
This is because polling on terrorism tends to 
occur after terror attacks occur.  That said, as 
Brigitte Nacos notes, terrorism rises and 
recedes very quickly as a salient issue in the 
mind of Americans.  She notes that after the 
1985 TWA hijacking, 13 percent of Americans 
saw terrorism as the most important problem 
facing their country according to a CBS/New 
York Times survey, whereas six months earlier 
terrorism had not been mentioned at all as an 
important problem facing America and six 
months later, less than 1 percent of respondents 
mentioned terrorism when faced with the same 
query81.   
Figure 5 combines data from polls asking 
Americans about whether they personally felt 
danger from terrorism82.  It clearly shows a rise 
in terror fears after Oklahoma City, though 
obviously not as high as the fear levels after 
the attacks of 11 September.  Note that the first 
poll in Figure 1 was conducted after the first 
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.  In 
addition to this data, polls asking Americans 
how worried they were that they or someone in 
their family would become victims of terrorism 
found that 42 percent of Americans were very 
or somewhat worried about this scenario in 
April 1995, a figure which receded to 35 
percent a year later and 27 percent two years 
later83.  Moreover, in the days after the 
Oklahoma bombing, 84 percent of 
Massachusetts residents polled by The Boston 
Herald believed that is was “very likely” or 
“somewhat likely” that an incident similar to 
the Oklahoma City bombing would occur in 
the US in the next few years84.  It is safe to say, 
then, that fear levels were high after the 
Oklahoma City bombing. 
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Figure 5 
US Mass Fear Levels 1993-2002
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
3/1
/93
4/1
/95
7/1
/95
9/1
1/0
1
9/1
1-1
2/0
1
9/1
3-1
4/0
1
9/2
0-
23
/01
10
/8-
9/0
1
10
/25
-28
/01
11
/13
-14
/01
12
/7-
10
/01
1/5
-6/
02
Date
F
ea
r 
L
ev
el
s
Feel Danger/Concern
 
 
There was also a public demand for 
government action after the Oklahoma 
bombing.  This is indicated by polls that show 
that Americans were willing to trade liberties 
for security after the Oklahoma City bombing.  
An April 1995 Los Angeles Times survey 
found that 49 percent of Americans thought 
that it was necessary for the average person to 
give up civil liberties in order to bolster 
security after the Oklahoma City bombing 
compared to 43 percent who thought that 
curbing liberties was unnecessary. 
 
Just as in the previous case, however, approval 
ratings were not in the executive’s favor.  
President Clinton’s approval rating after the 
Oklahoma City bombing was a paltry 45 
percent according to the Harris Interactive poll.  
Moreover, Clinton’s approval ratings saw no 
‘rally effect’ after the terrorist incident in 
Oklahoma.  Indeed, his average approval rating 
for 1995 was 47%, similar to his 46% average 
rating from the previous year85.  Here it is 
important to emphasize that once again 
approval ratings seem to have played a big part 
in determining the fate of an executive’s 
counterterror legislation. 
 
All three political constellation variables 
contributed in explaining why Clinton was 
unable to push through his counter-terror bill 
through Congress.  Recalling that these 
variables are legislative composition, party 
competition and political institution, let us look 
at the first one. In 1994, President Clinton’s 
party lost more seats than in any midterm 
election since 1946: Democrats lost 54 seats 
and control of House for the first time in 40 
years as well as nine Senate seats86.  The 
historic shift of power emboldened the GOP to  
 
 
challenge Clinton, and also was indicative of a 
weak executive mandate.  Party competition, 
as measured by temporal proximity to an 
election, also had something to do with why 
the legislation was blocked, as 1996 was a 
presidential election year and the head of 
Senate Republicans, Bob Dole, was running 
for president.  Finally, the bicameral nature of 
the American legislature played a strong role 
in halting the quick passage of counter-terror 
legislation. As explained above, the Senate 
quickly passed Clinton’s anti-terror bill after 
Oklahoma City, but the House halted its 
passage for a full year.  Although many 
scholars have posited that presidential systems 
are more likely to lead to abuses of power, due 
to the presence of a more powerful executive87, 
here the legislative-executive antagonism 
inherent in the American system and 
particularly the existence of the bicameral 
legislature served as a strong check against 
executive power. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the majority of cases where large terrorist 
attacks lead to executives pushing for broad 
counterterror legislation, the executives get 
their way.  The cases in this article exhibited 
the value of the following five factors.  First, 
executive threat-shaping was once against 
bolstered as the independent variable in 
pushing counterterror legislation.  Though both 
Clinton and Blair were blocked in their initial 
pursuits of legislation, they both eventually got 
most of what they wanted from their respective 
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legislatures though with a time delay.  Shaping 
the terror threat as a law enforcement issue, or 
a crime, proved to be a hindrance to passing 
anti-terror law.  Both Clinton and, at times, 
Blair framed the terror threat as a criminal 
matter and this framing simply made the threat 
appear less urgent and important.  Second, also 
bolstering the importance of the executive in 
pushing post-terror attack responses, executive 
approval ratings proved to be critical in 
determining whether or not anti-terror laws 
would be passed.  Neither case saw a rally 
‘round the leader’ effect after the terror attack 
and both leaders examined had poor approval 
ratings both before and after the attacks.  That 
said, mass fear levels, though a constant across 
cases, were clearly important in pushing the 
threat. 
 
Third, the executive’s mandate proved to be 
particularly important in these cases.  Even 
with a favorable partisan composition of the 
government, Blair’s mandate was weak given 
poor election results and a poor approval 
rating.  Clinton’s mandate, also given poor 
election results and a poor approval rating, was 
also weak.  Fourth, political competition was 
heightened in the Clinton case, and arguably in 
the Blair case.  For Clinton, impending 
elections emboldened opposition Republicans.  
For Blair, growing unrest within the Labour 
Party and calls for Gordon Brown to replace 
him as leader of the party created internal 
political competition.  Finally, political 
institutions, previously found to be 
unimportant in the passage of counterterror 
legislation, were critical in shaping the 
Oklahoma City bombing case.  The bicameral 
nature of the American legislature, rather than 
the presence of an office of the executive, 
created a strong and sufficient check on Bill 
Clinton’s counterterror bill. 
 
Given these findings, the above theory can be 
revised to look as it does below.  In Figure 6, 
all of the variables remain the same with the 
exception of the constraint variables that 
appear below the executive response and 
threat-shaping independent variable.  Instead 
of generally showing public opinion and mass 
fear levels constraining the executive, it has 
now been shown that executive approval 
ratings and mass fear levels constrain 
executive action.  Furthermore, the political 
institutions variable has exhibited that 
proximity to elections, composition of 
government, temporary right-left government 
coalitions, and bicameral legislatures can 
stymie the passage of anti-terror legislation.  
The political institutions variable is here 
revised as political competition and number of 
checks on the executive.  Political competition 
means both temporal proximity to election and 
internal competition within a party that, in a 
parliamentary system of government, may lead 
to a leadership change or the calling of a new 
election.  Checks on government can come in 
the form of a bicameral legislature, a 
temporary coalition, or an opposition party 
controlling the legislature.  Other cases may 
show that other checks are important, but it is 
clear that the more checks on the executive, the 
harder it will be for him to pass legislation.  
That said, these checks, such as the partisan 
composition of the legislature and temporary 
coalitions, are not necessarily etched into 
institutions.  Rather some are institutional but 
most are borne out of the regular legislative 
process.  By defining this constraint variable as 
“political competition and number of checks,” 
I have taken account of the findings made here 
while allowing for future idiosyncratic 
outcomes in other cases. 
 
Figure 6: Revised Theory 
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Although stating that increased checks on 
government executives can stop civil liberty-
abridging legislation sounds heartening, most 
of the time counterterror laws get quickly 
passed after major terror attacks.  The main 
factor behind the blocked passage of counter-
terror laws appears to be weak executive 
mandates, which allowed existing checks to 
take effect and new checks—in the form of 
right-left coalitions—to form.  It remains to be 
seen whether a strong, well-liked executive can 
be blocked in his pursuit of liberty-reducing 
laws after a terror attack.  Perhaps increased 
awareness about the debate surrounding trades 
of liberty-for-security in response to terrorism 
will embolden both members of government 
legislatures and their publics to stop chief 
executives from passing liberty-abridging 
laws.  But what may ultimately be necessary is 
the rise of government leaders who have the 
strength to counsel patience and emphasize the 
values of our liberties after terror attacks occur.  
After all, terror attacks are fleeting, though 
terrible and tragic, events.  But, the loss of 
liberties they too frequently portend can be 
permanent. 
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